Small and medium-sized enterprise policy: Designed to fail? by Wapshott R & Mallett O
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Newcastle University ePrints - eprint.ncl.ac.uk 
 
Wapshott R, Mallett O. Small and medium-sized enterprise policy: Designed 
to fail?. Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space 2017 
Copyright: 
This is the authors’ accepted manuscript of an article that has been published in its final definitive 
form by Sage Publishing, 2017 
DOI link to article: 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2399654417719288 
Date deposited:   
18/07/2017 
  
1 
Small and medium-sized enterprise policy: Designed to fail? 
Abstract 
Significant doubts persist over the effectiveness of government policy to increase the numbers 
or performance of small and medium-sized enterprises in the UK economy. We analyse UK 
political manifestoes from 1964-2015 to examine the development of SME policy in political 
discourse. We do this by analysing how the broadly-defined category of ‘SME’ has been 
characterised in the manifestoes and assess these characterisations in relation to the empirical 
evidence base. We highlight three consistent themes in UK political manifestoes during 1964-
2015 where SMEs have been characterised as having the potential for growth, struggling to 
access finance and being over-burdened by regulation. We argue that homogenising the broad 
range of businesses represented by the SME category and characterising them in these terms 
misrepresents them, undermining policies developed in relation to this mischaracterisation. 
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Introduction 
Enterprise policy constitutes policies aimed at both start-ups (entrepreneurship policies) and 
existing firms classified as small and medium-sized enterprises (SME policies), with ‘virtually 
all organs of government [having] programs which qualify as either EP or SMEP’ (Lundström 
et al., 2014: 946). Governments intervene in a range of ways, acting as ‘…a regulator, 
incentiviser and facilitator, or as a supplier’ as well as a supporter of other, non-governmental 
forms of influence and support (Bennett, 2014: 25). Such interventions have existed for a long 
time, in the UK at least since the 1930s, gaining significance in political discourse since the 
1970s with expenditure rising to £8bn per year (Greene et al., 2007; Hughes, 2008; Richard, 
2008). We therefore argue that it is important to examine SME policies and the characterisation 
of the category ‘SME’ in political discourse. 
Despite significant efforts and expenditure, UK SME policies have often failed to achieve their 
aims (Bridge, 2010) and persistent doubts surround their necessity and cost effectiveness 
(Curran, 2000). Evaluations of SME policies have proven challenging (Curran, 2000; Storey, 
2005) and have produced mixed results, with government-sponsored evaluations tending to be 
more positive than independent, academic evaluations (Bridge, 2010; Huggins, 1997). Critical 
considerations of specific policies have identified problems with displacement and deadweight 
effects (Curran and Storey, 2002; Nightingale and Coad, 2016; Wren, 1996) as well as a lack 
of understanding of the challenges identified (Nightingale and Coad, 2016). Researchers have 
also questioned whether policies are sufficiently coordinated (Huggins and Williams, 2009; 
Turok, 1997), whether available research evidence is being overlooked in forming policy 
(Arshed et al., 2014; Curran and Storey, 2002) and whether government ministers and 
policymakers have sufficient expertise to intervene in timely and relevant ways (Bennett 2008). 
Reflecting on these criticisms, Blackburn and Schaper (2012) present three persistent 
challenges to the development of SME policy: a lack of progress due to poor learning from 
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previous experience; poor use of the evidence base or rigorous evaluation; and poor 
collaboration and information sharing between relevant parties. 
In this article, we analyse UK political manifestoes from 1964-2015 to examine the 
development of SME policy in political discourse. We do this by analysing how the broadly-
defined category of ‘SME’ has been characterised by politicians in party manifestoes and assess 
these characterisations in relation to the empirical evidence base. We highlight three consistent 
themes in UK political manifestoes during the past 50 years where SMEs have been 
characterised as having the potential for growth, struggling to access finance and being over-
burdened by regulation. We argue that homogenising the broad range of businesses represented 
by the SME category and characterising them in these terms misrepresents them, undermining 
policies developed in relation to this mischaracterisation. We begin the article by briefly tracing 
the category of SME and why it is important to understand how this category has come to be 
characterised. 
Categorising SMEs 
To effectively deliver policy, the European Commission has, since 2005, defined SMEs for 
itself and its member states (including the UK) as enterprises that ‘employ fewer than 250 
persons; and have either an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million or an annual balance 
sheet total not exceeding EUR 43 million’ (European Commission, 2015: 10). In the UK, where 
statistics tend to adopt the employment definition (fewer than 250 employees), SMEs have 
come to represent 99.9% of private businesses (BIS, 2016). This includes a diverse range of 
firms in terms of size, age, industry and locality (Cosh and Hughes, 1996; Huggins et al, 2015) 
and less tangible dimensions such as the firm’s relationships with the labour market, 
management style or available networks (Gilman and Edwards, 2007; Wapshott and Mallett, 
2015). While it lacks specificity, the SME category is a way of grouping together firms that, 
4 
until the 1960s, had been relatively ignored in UK politics (Beesley and Wilson, 1981). An 
important development in addressing this omission was the Bolton Committee.  
The Bolton Committee was appointed in 1969 by the Labour government to assess the role of 
small firms in the UK economy and make recommendations on improving government policy. 
The Committee adopted the definition of less than 200 employees from its terms of reference 
for manufacturing firms and ‘a series of more or less arbitrary definitions in terms of whatever 
measures appear appropriate for other trades’ due to a lack of comprehensive records (Bolton, 
1971: 2). The categorisation of businesses that was reinforced by these definitions has proven 
influential, with the Committee’s findings and recommendations forming ‘the bedrock of 
virtually all [SME] research, analysis and policy making’ (Curran and Stanworth, 1982: 3; see 
also HL Deb 12 February 2003; Kirby, 2004). While SME has become the dominant term, it is 
often used in UK policymaking interchangeably with ‘small business’ (NAO, 2006), reflecting 
the Bolton Committee’s aims as differentiating these businesses from large firms. 
However, the report was a reflection rather than a cause of the growing political prominence 
of SMEs that accompanied the retreat of Keynsianism (Nightingale and Coad, 2016) and did 
not fix a definitive way of categorising SMEs in UK politics. ‘SME’ is a flexible category that 
is invariably functional, albeit the general trend has been towards greater simplification, often 
losing Bolton’s attention to sector (Ward and Rhodes, 2014). The specific definition adopted 
depends on the formulation of particular policies, usually in practical terms of employee 
numbers or financial turnover (e.g. HL Deb 12 February 2003). Further, the definitions for 
qualifying criteria can be subject to change, for example in the expansion of Small Firm 
Employment Subsidy (from a 50 employee limit to 200) or the extension of exemptions from 
Value-Added Taxation and statutory audit requirements (in terms of turnover). These changes 
in the SME definition illustrate how it can function as a statistical convenience, representing 
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for example the extent of a scheme’s funding, rather than the focused targeting of a discrete 
group of businesses.  
Given the heterogeneity and significant changes within the population of businesses 
categorised as SMEs (Cosh and Hughes, 1996, 1998; Hughes, 2008), it is perhaps surprising 
that this category should be used as a focus for policy. Nonetheless, the SME category is 
frequently deployed in political discourse and in policymaking in terms of its rationale, forms 
of intervention and qualifying criteria. The area of SME policy that has emerged in relation to 
this categorisation of a loosely gathered collection of businesses has been developed in terms 
of how they have been characterised and it is this characterisation in UK political discourse 
and its implications for policymaking that forms our analytical focus. 
Characterising SMEs 
The purpose of the Bolton Committee and part of its subsequent influence was in making sense 
of the economic role of SMEs and developing policy recommendations aimed at them (Fuller, 
2003). Committee Chair John Bolton argued that, previously, ‘the formulation of industrial 
policy has inevitably proceeded without adequate knowledge of small firms’ (Bolton, 1971: 
xv). The committee argued that what gives unity and meaning to the category of the small firm 
is that they have relatively little market share, personalised management and that they tend to 
lack formal management structures and unions. Subsequent debates around how to characterise 
SMEs and the challenges they face reflect the ways in which political actors ‘compose stories 
that describe harms and difficulties, attribute them to actions of other individuals or 
organizations, and thereby claim the right to invoke government power to stop the harm’ 
(Stone, 1989: 282). The characterisation of SMEs, in terms of their distinguishing features and 
the challenges they are perceived to face, represents a framing of the problem that is taken up 
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by politicians and policymakers with powerful implications for the ‘overture, process and 
outcome’ of policymaking (Weiss, 1989: 118; see also Rochefort and Cobb, 1993). 
As we will discuss, this category and its characterisation has been taken up, developed, revised 
and renewed by politicians as well as by other political actors. It guides policymaking in terms 
of identifying how to provide support for these businesses or remove barriers they are perceived 
to face. The Bolton Report continued to be an important reference point for government reports 
and white papers (e.g. Burdens on Business, DTI, 1985) but the characterisation of SMEs, as 
with other areas of policymaking, is malleable (Rochefort and Cobb, 1993) and has shifted 
with different political contexts, economic challenges and the development of new insights 
(Weiss, 1989). It is the changing characterisation of SMEs that we seek to analyse in this article 
to gain insights into the underlying assumptions that underpin SME policies. 
Specifically, we analyse political manifestoes to explore how SMEs have been characterised in 
UK political discourse during the period 1964-2015. If a political manifesto sets out what its 
authors see as problems and potential policy solutions, once elected on the basis of this 
manifesto the incoming government is establishing a platform for action. The characterisations 
of the SME category create the impression of common concerns and challenges, a problem 
definition that governments then seek to address (Weiss, 1989). Our analysis highlights three 
significant ways that SMEs are characterised relating to their having the potential for growth, 
struggling to access funding and being over-burdened by regulation, each of which act as causal 
stories, creating particular roles for government intervention (Stone, 1989). We draw on the 
empirical evidence base to challenge these portrayals and argue that, if the businesses 
homogenised under categories such as SME are significantly mischaracterised then SME 
policy will continue to be ineffective. 
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Methodology: Analysing UK Political Debate on SMEs 
Political manifestoes 
To explore the characterisation of SMEs in UK political discourse, we analyse General Election 
manifestoes from the period 1964-2015. The inclusion and treatment of topics such as SMEs 
in political texts are important influences on how they are framed and understood more widely 
(Atkinson, 2015; Finlayson, 2007). General Election manifestoes represent a significant series 
of comparable political texts over time and are therefore an important source of understanding 
how SMEs are characterised (Beesley and Wilson, 1981; Beresford, 2015). 
Manifestoes ‘…consist of statements connoting intentions, emphases, promises, pledges, 
policies or goals to be activated should that party achieve office’ (Bara, 2005: 585). As such, 
these official statements produced by political parties establish a platform for action if elected 
and a record against which parties and party leaders can be held to account (Laver and Garry, 
2000). Moreover, despite increasing scepticism among electorates over politicians keeping 
election promises, available evidence suggests that elected parties generally do follow-through 
on manifesto pledges, especially in Britain’s political institutional structure (Bara, 2005; 
Royed, 1996). The issues featured by manifestoes and the positions taken on those issues are 
therefore important. 
Our period of analysis incorporates each General Election from 1964 to 2015, following 
Beesley and Wilson (1981), who demonstrate how SME research and policymaking in the UK 
intensified from the mid-1960s (also see Bennett, 2014; Dannreuther and Perren, 2013; Kirby, 
2004). This is not to suggest that SME policy did not exist before this period, see for example 
discussions in the Macmillan Committee (1931) and the Radcliffe Committee (1959), but rather 
that it became more prominent after the 1960s. The period 1964-2015 features political parties 
of different ideologies operating across a wide range of social and economic contexts 
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addressing SMEs in their manifestoes in increasing detail, something we explore in the findings 
below.  
We focus on the three ‘mainstream’ parties of the period, referred to here as Conservative, 
Labour and Liberal (the latter encompassing the SDP-Liberal Alliance, 1981, Social & Liberal 
Democrats, 1988, and Liberal Democrats, 1989), providing an opportunity to observe areas of 
consensus, difference and development in how SMEs were characterised over time (Laver and 
Garry, 2000). Across the 14 General Elections falling within our period of analysis this includes 
a total of 42 manifestoes. The year of each election is listed in Table 1 together with the title of 
each manifesto and subheadings relating to sections engaged with SME policy. 
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Year Party Manifesto Headings related to small firms (section header / sub-heading ) 
1964 Con Prosperity with a purpose - 
 Labb The New Britain Planning the new Britain – A national plan 
 Lib Think for yourself Creating the wealth – Cost of living 
1966 Con Action not words Blueprint for a Parliament – To ensure prosperity with steadier prices 
 Labb Time for decision - 
 Lib For all the people - 
1970 Conb A better tomorrow Our Programme – Lower taxes; Industrial progress 
 Lab Now Britain's strong… - 
 Lib What a life! The small business; The independent trader; The farmer and grower 
1974 Con Firm action for a fair Britain 
Industry, Agriculture, and the Regions 
 Labb 
Let us work together… - 
Labour's way out of the crisis 
- 
 Lib Change the face of Britain - 
1974a Con Putting Britain first People and Industry – Small business; The impact of wealth and gifts taxes 
 Labb Britain will win with Labour - 
 Lib Why Britain needs Liberal govt. - 
1979 Conb General Election manifesto A more prosperous country – Small businesses 
 Lab The Labour way is the better way Jobs and prosperity 
 Lib The real fight is for Britain Economic and Industrial Reform – More jobs in new industries 
1983 Conb The challenge of our times 
Encouraging Free Enterprise – More small firms; Improving our 
environment – Reviving Britain’s cities; public transport 
 Lab The new hope for Britain Planning for people – The inner-cities 
 Lib Working together for Britain Government and Industry – New and small businesses 
1987 Conb The next moves forward Building Prosperity and Employment – Lower taxes; Creating New Jobs 
 Lab Britain will win with Labour - 
 Lib Britain united: the time has come 
Rebuilding British Industry – Backing small business; Industrial investment 
bonds; Agriculture; Our longer-term objectives; Protecting and enhancing our 
countryside 
1992 Conb The best future for Britain 
The route to lower taxes; Setting the economy free; Small Businesses; 
Whitehall & Westminster; Cities; Wales  
 Lab 
It's time to get Britain working 
again 
Immediate action for national recovery – Action for industry; Building a 
strong economy - We will modernise Britain’s industries; We will strengthen 
our regional economies; We will abolish the poll tax 
 Lib 
Changing Britain for good 
Britain's Prosperity: Public Investment; Private Enterprise – Promoting 
enterprise 
1997 Con 
You can only be sure with the 
Conservatives Jobs and business – Small businesses – Britain’s risk takers; Our Vision for 
Britain: 25 Pledges for the Nation – The enterprise centre of Europe 
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 Labb 
new Labour because Britain 
deserves better 
We will help create successful and profitable businesses – Backing small 
business; Local economic growth; A sensibly set minimum wage 
 Lib Make the difference 
Our priorities – Investing in Britain’s future; Investing in enterprise; Rural 
communities 
2001 Con Time for common sense Less regulation 
 Labb Ambitions for Britain Investment and reform; The productivity challenge – staying better off 
 Lib Freedom, Justice, Honesty 
Employment and training; Protecting consumers and backing business; 
Action for your local community 
2005 Con It’s time for action Lower taxes (less regulation) 
 Labb Britain forward not back 
Supporting enterprise; Competition, planning and regulation; Fostering 
entrepreneurship;  
 Lib The real alternative 
A stable, well-managed economy; Business – Cut the red tape that stops 
businesses from growing; Introduce small business rate relief  
2010 Conb 
Invitation to join the government 
of Britain 
Create a safer banking system that serves the needs of the economy; Ensure 
macroeconomic stability - …stop Labour’s jobs tax; Get Britain working 
again – Boost small business; Encourage enterprise;  
 Lab A future fair for all 
Building the high-growth economy of the future – Championing an enterprise 
economy 
 Libb Change that works for you Enabling enterprise that benefits Britain 
2015 Conb 
Strong leadership, a clear 
economic plan, a brighter, more 
secure future 
Our plan of action - We will boost apprenticeships and help you secure a good 
job; We will reward entrepreneurship; We will cut red tape, boost start-ups and 
small businesses 
 Lab Britain can be better 
We will build an economy that works for working people - Improving 
productivity and a new industrial strategy; Backing small business 
 Lib Opportunity for everyone 
Economic and industrial growth; Banking and financial reform; Pride in 
creativity; Britain in Europe 
Table 1. UK general election manifestoes.  
Two General elections in 1974, a denotes October 1974 election (as opposed to February 1974); b Party elected (2010 Con 
and Lib governed as a coalition) 
 
Analysing political manifestoes 
Thematic coding was used to analyse each manifesto in terms of SMEs and SME policy. Given 
the breadth of the category SME and the potential ways in which its use may have changed 
during the period of analysis we analysed the manifestoes in terms of a range of potential 
synonyms. In the first instance, each manifesto was searched electronically for the following 
principal terms (and variants): business; enterprise; entrepreneur; independent trader; new 
business; own account; self-employed; shopkeeper; small firm; sole trader; and SME. We are 
not suggesting that these terms are each equivalent to SME but, instead, that these terms relate 
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to potential areas of what we are referring to as SME policy (following Lundström et al., 2014, 
and others) and therefore to the characterisation of the SME category. Sections of text 
containing one or more of the search terms were analytically coded before each manifesto was 
re-read in full to check the rigour of the initial analysis and to establish a clearer sense of the 
context surrounding the mention of SMEs (and related terms) as well as to ensure a broader 
understanding of the parties’ positioning for each General Election. 
The inductive analysis identified characterisations of SMEs as having the potential for growth, 
struggling to access funding and being over-burdened by regulation. In our Findings we discuss 
the emergence and development of these characterisations. We set aside the additional issue of 
taxation, specifically its burdensome nature on SMEs because, in this context, it overlaps into 
the personal finances of the business-owners rather than being concerned with the enterprises 
per se and we are focused on the characterisation of SMEs. Having identified the key themes, 
we grounded our analysis through the identification of relevant government policy 
interventions to addresses concerns that manifestoes contain simply empty talk or rhetoric 
(Laver and Garry, 2000). We then explored evidence from a range of sources, principally 
academic literature (including key research projects such as Storey, 1994, the Small Business 
Research Trust, SBRT no date, and the Centre for Business Research, CBR, e.g. Cosh and 
Hughes, 1996, 1998, Cosh et al 2009b) to understand whether these characterisations of SMEs 
are supported empirically. The following section presents the results of our analysis. 
Findings 
Our focus on the characterisation of SMEs in political manifestoes inevitably foregrounds 
SMEs over other aspects of contemporary political debate. In the next section we therefore 
offer a broad overview of how SMEs have been characterised in General Election manifestoes 
in relation to political debates and the wider context. In the subsequent three sections, we then 
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discuss in greater detail the core characterisations of SMEs as having the potential for growth, 
struggling to access finance and being over-burdened by regulation. 
SMEs in UK political manifestoes 
The approach to industrial strategy in the 1960s continued earlier policies to target full 
employment by focusing on specific industries and large businesses and, for Labour especially, 
this meant mergers and acquisitions to develop economies of scale and exploit new technology 
(Tomlinson, 1994). However, SMEs were appearing on the political agenda in relation to 
particular sectors, early manifesto mentions including, for example, the 1964 Liberal pledge to 
protect shopkeepers from discrimination from suppliers.  
With the economic challenges of the late 1960s and the beginnings of a significant move away 
from Keynsianism, SME policy became more prominent following interventions such as, in 
1969, the Conservative Political Centre pamphlet ‘From Acorns to Oaks’ (Weatherill and Cope, 
1969) and Labour’s appointment of the Bolton Committee. The subsequent Conservative 
government had established in its 1970 manifesto that it would ‘decide the best method of 
providing advice and encouragement for small businesses in the light of the Bolton Report’, 
arguing that ‘Small businesses have had a raw deal from Labour’, criticisms echoed by the 
Liberals. From this point onwards, SMEs are principally characterised in the manifestoes as 
small, often referred to as ‘small businesses’, that is, in contrast with larger organisations. This 
contrast, and the emphasis that SMEs are a distinct grouping, underpins a belief that they have 
particular needs that politicians can help to address (May and McHugh, 2002; Stone, 1989). 
This can be seen in the manifestoes where SMEs are addressed by specific policies as well as 
receiving proposed exemptions, for example from workforce training initiatives (Liberal, 
1997). 
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The importance of SMEs to the UK economy, and especially the growth of these firms 
providing a source of employment (see the next section), came to form a common theme in the 
political manifestoes. The Conservative October 1974 manifesto featured a dedicated section 
on Small Businesses in which this ‘backbone of British enterprise’ is described as ‘immensely 
important to the economic life of Britain and to future industrial growth’. From the mid-1970s, 
the language of the manifestoes repeatedly associates SMEs with economic growth, whether 
through references to them as ‘the seedcorn of the economy’ and ‘the seedcorn of Britain's 
prosperity’ (Conservative, 1992, 1997) or forming part of plans for industrial renewal (e.g. 
Liberal, 1979; Labour 1992). Irrespective of political and economic context, this 
characterisation of SMEs as central to the economy and to economic growth has become 
common across all three political parties (e.g. remaining ‘the backbone of our economy’, 
Labour, 2015), for some commentators reflecting the appropriation of SMEs by ‘the politics of 
economic growth’ (Fuller, 2006: 2).  
By the time of the 1979 General Election, policy proposals were beginning to engage with the 
potential for SMEs in tackling problems of high inflation and unemployment owing to their 
lack of concentrated market power and typically high labour-intensity (Bannock, 1981). The 
Conservative government elected in 1979 oversaw a credit-inspired boom that saw the stock 
of SMEs expand significantly throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (Hughes, 2008) and the 
development of high profile initiatives such as the Training and Enterprise Councils (Huggins, 
1997). This period is often discussed in terms of neoliberalism and the manifestoes tied SMEs 
to key areas of neoliberal policymaking, including financialisation (SMEs characterised as 
struggling to access finance, see below), deregulation and market liberalisation (SMEs 
characterised as over-burdened by regulation, see below) but also individual freedoms and the 
retreat of the state in terms of an enterprise culture and self-employment (though this was more 
clearly related to entrepreneurship and business start-up than SME policies). While ideological 
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differences between the mainstream parties appeared stark, especially in terms of state 
intervention, contemporary commentators noted that ‘Support for small firms is that rara avis 
of industrial policy – something which commands support across all the major parties’ (Watkins 
et al., 1982: 1).  
By 1997, the traditional Conservative reputation for economic competence was tarnished by 
the failed Poll Tax and a troubled economy, experienced especially harshly among SMEs (Bank 
of England, 1992) and with a substantial decline in SMEs numbers (Hughes, 2008). Labour, 
having implemented significant changes under Tony Blair, claimed that ‘Support for small 
businesses will have a major role in our plans for economic growth’ (Labour, 1997). Forming 
their first government in 18 years, Labour developed an increasing interest in self-employment 
and SMEs shaped by their focus on regional development, including help for disadvantaged 
groups and communities (Beresford, 2015; Huggins and Williams, 2009; Huggins et al., 2014). 
In this way, new policy areas were brought within the scope of SME policy with these 
businesses, and entrepreneurship more generally, seen as a potential solution to a range of 
economic and societal challenges. The Conservatives tied their SME proposals to promoting 
the ‘right values’, while the Liberals continued to develop SME policies in a range of specific 
areas and industries including supporting fisheries and local economies. While this broader 
sense of the implications of SME policy became commonplace, the 2010 and 2015 General 
Elections were dominated by the 2008 economic crash and a lack of confidence in the financial 
sector. In the manifestoes, access to finance by SMEs gained renewed attention, linked to 
prominent concerns with improving the banking sector.  
Across these periods of significant economic, social and political change, ideological shifts and 
differences between the main political parties, our analysis identifies an increasing amount of 
attention paid to SMEs in political manifestoes, as demonstrated in Table 2. Three significant 
characterisations of SMEs emerge from our analysis: having the potential for growth, 
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struggling to access finance and being over-burdened by regulation. It is these characterisations 
and how they developed over time that we now discuss, taking each theme in turn. 
Year Party SME Growth Finance Regulation 
1964 Con     
 Lab s    
 Lib s    
1966 Con s G   
 Lab     
 Lib     
1970 Con s   r 
 Lab     
 Lib S  f  
1974 Con s G   
 Lab     
 Lib     
1974 Con S  F r 
 Lab     
 Lib     
1979 Con S G  R 
 Lab s G   
 Lib s G   
1983 Con S G F R 
 Lab s    
 Lib S G F R 
1987 Con s G   
 Lab     
 Lib S G F r 
1992 Con S G F r 
 Lab s  f  
 Lib s  F r 
1997 Con S G  R 
 Lab S g  r 
 Lib s g F R 
2001 Con s g  R 
 Lab s   R 
 Lib s   R 
2005 Con s   R 
 Lab S g F r 
 Lib S G  R 
2010 Con S g F R 
 Lab s g F r 
 Lib s    
2015 Con S  F R 
 Lab S G F R 
 Lib s  F R 
Table 2. Presence of themes in manifestoes.  
Note: upper case indicates where SME/synonym (S) receives a heading or where coded 
characterisation (in relation to growth potential, G, access to finance, F, or burdens of regulation, R) 
receives clear, explicit attention. Lower case indicates mention of SMEs (s) or a less detailed or 
indirect characterisation (g, f or r). 
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SMEs have the potential to grow 
Since the late 1960s and early 1970s, SMEs have been associated with the potential to grow 
and thereby provide economic growth and renewal. Irrespective of SME owners’ desire to 
‘conform to the idea of growth – almost as a moral imperative’ (Golby and Johns, 1971: 5), 
politicians began to emphasise their potential impact on unemployment, for example ‘if all 
Britain’s small firms took on one extra employee’ (Expenditure Committee, 1978). Within a 
general association of SMEs and growth, of interest to politicians has therefore been the 
potential for SME growth to contribute to job creation (Atkinson and Storey, 1994; Nightingale 
and Coad, 2013). Much of the increase in government intervention post-Bolton can be 
associated with efforts to help SMEs grow (Beesley and Wilson, 1981), a level of initiatives 
that touched 3000 by 2006/7 (Public Accounts Committee, 2007). 
In the economic crises that set the scene for the 1979 General Election, with the country facing 
increasing unemployment and ‘economic decay’ (Liberal, 1979), the link between SME growth 
and job creation became increasingly important. The incumbent Labour Government promised 
the continuation of the small firms employment subsidy (paying small manufacturing firms for 
jobs created) and proposed returning jobs to the inner-cities by stimulating the development of 
SMEs. The soon-to-be-elected Conservatives asserted explicitly that ‘The creation of new jobs 
depends to a great extent on the success of smaller businesses’. For the Liberals, the link was 
more implicit but SMEs, and positive discrimination in their favour, was still associated with 
job creation.  
The idea that SMEs were responsible for a disproportionately high number of jobs had gained 
increased attention with the 1979 publication of Birch’s influential study. Birch reported that 
two-thirds of net new jobs created, in a sample of 5.6 million US businesses (1969-1976), were 
in firms employing twenty or fewer people (Birch, 1981). In 1984 Birch was invited to a job 
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generation conference sponsored by the Department of Trade and Industry. The conference 
reflected the contrary evidence that had begun to emerge around the role of SMEs in creating 
new jobs and an increasing questioning of Birch’s findings (Ganguly, 1985; Hirschberg, 1999). 
Exploring the impact of SMEs as job creators in the UK, Storey and Johnson (1987: 41) 
conclude that ‘…over a decade half the jobs created in every 100 small firms occur in the four 
firms which grow fastest.’ Similar findings have been reported from the CBR studies, for 
example in Cosh and Hughes (1996) and Bullock et al (2000). More recently, Anyadike-Danes 
et al. (2015) highlight the importance of a very small number of ‘extraordinary prolific job 
creators’ (2015: 22). Research has therefore emphasised the role played not by the broad 
category of SMEs but by a minority of firms driving a disproportionate amount of job creation 
(Henrekson and Johansson, 2010).  
The problematic nature of claims that SMEs, rather than a minority of firms, are responsible 
for a disproportionate amount of net job creation has been widely discussed. However, in the 
manifestoes, characterising SMEs in these terms has persisted and SME policies have often 
followed this characterisation, not only in terms of the rationales presented but the details of 
the policies themselves. While a few policies targeted key sectors such as manufacturing, the 
focus on ‘More Small Firms’ (Conservative, 1983) or ‘Backing Small Business’ (Liberal, 1987) 
continued to propose measures relating to removing general obstacles affecting all SMEs rather 
than attempts to target the small proportion of firms responsible for a disproportionate amount 
of net job creation. For example, while Labour have generally had less to propose in this area, 
both Conservatives and Liberals have frequently suggested SME job creation could be 
supported through reductions in taxation, access to public procurement and the areas of access 
to finance and burdens of regulation discussed below. These types of proposal tend not 
discriminate amongst SMEs nor address how to support the limited number of potentially high 
growth firms.  
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Where SME policy in the 1980s focused largely on creating more SMEs, the 1988 DTI white 
paper The Department for Enterprise marked a move towards improving the quality of SMEs. 
In setting out an Enterprise Initiative this paper shifted attention ‘to concentrate resources on 
improving the competitiveness of small and medium-sized firms’ (Wren, 1996: 185; see also 
Greene et al., 2007; North et al., 1997). By the 1992 General Election, all three parties were 
making manifesto commitments concerning advisory and support services, building on earlier 
schemes such as the Small Firms Service and Business Development Service and leading to 
the expansion of more intensive support through government grants for accessing external 
consultancy (Bennett, 2012). Business Growth Training, for example, targeted support for 
‘smaller’ firms (defined as fewer than 500 employees), providing financial support to access 
training and improve performance.  
Government white papers included proposals to target high growth firms (e.g. DTI, 1994, 1995; 
see Smallbone, 1997) on the basis that ‘Small firms […] are a major source of job creation’ 
(DTI, 1994: 12). Business Link (a state-funded ‘one stop shop’ for business support, proposed 
and developed in the manifestoes of all three parties) therefore aimed to help more small firms 
to grow into medium and large businesses, representing a shift from focusing primarily on start-
ups to existing businesses (Priest, 1999). Business Link’s Personal Business Advisors were 
instructed to target growth-oriented firms (Smallbone, 1997), in addition to Business Link’s 
more general SME focus (defined by employment numbers). However, Forte (2011) recounts 
his personal experience that there was a lack of clarity on how to define or identify these 
businesses and this contributed to a more general variability of provision (Bennett and Robson, 
2004).  
Having the potential to grow is an important characterisation of SMEs throughout the 
manifestoes but, as Kiviluoto (2013) argues, business growth is not part of the everyday 
realities of running an SME for many owner-managers. The majority of firms do not grow in 
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size but are, for roughly half of all new businesses, likely to fail within the first four years 
(Storey, 2011; see also Coad et al., 2013). The characterisation, apparent in the manifestoes, of 
SMEs as having growth potential is therefore wide of the mark, contraction or exit appears to 
be the most likely outcome over the longer-term (Anyadike-Danes et al., 2015). Further, as 
Shane (2009: 142) argues, most business founders are not establishing their business in order 
to grow them and create jobs but, rather, as ‘wage-substitution businesses’ (see also, Scase and 
Goffee, 1982; Sloan and Chittenden, 2006). Even during the 1980s, the ‘age of the small 
business owner’ (Scase and Goffee, 1987: 17), attitudes towards business growth remained 
mixed (Hakim, 1989; Scase and Goffee, 1987; Storey, 1989) and varied by firms’ size (Cosh 
and Hughes, 1994). Perhaps most disappointingly for the politicians who pin their hopes for 
job generation on SMEs, responses to the Small Business Research Trust survey across the 
1990s and early 2000s indicate that SME owners did not view business growth in terms of 
providing employment, preferring to grow turnover and profits rather than headcounts (SBRT, 
no date; also see Gibb, 2000; Greene et al., 2004) 
Characterising SMEs, generally, as having the potential to grow and create jobs may prove 
popular in manifestoes but seems to bear only limited resemblance to the portrayal of SMEs in 
the research literature. It is apparent that some SMEs have the ambition and ability to grow and 
a handful prove extremely successful at creating new jobs. It cannot be said, however, that the 
performance of these few firms provides a helpful model on which to base a wider 
characterisation of SMEs or their potential role in the economy. A more accurate 
characterisation for a majority of SMEs would reflect an ambivalent attitude towards growth, 
especially in respect of jobs, from owner-managers for whom business contraction or exit 
appear to be the most likely outcome over the long-term.  
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SMEs struggle to access finance  
There have been long-standing and persistent concerns raised in relation to the availability of 
finance for SMEs since at least 1931 when the Macmillan Committee reported difficulties for 
small firms obtaining long-term capital (Macmillan, 1931). The so-called Macmillan gap 
(Frost, 1954), implying a market failure in terms of provision, is perceived as harming not only 
the daily operation of SMEs but to act as a brake on their business growth: firms are not able 
to invest and thereby expand. These concerns are reflected in UK political manifestoes where 
SMEs are characterised as facing problems in accessing external finance. While the Liberals 
in 1970 highlighted the ‘credit squeeze’ among ‘very heavy burdens’ on SMEs, the 
Conservatives in October 1974 argued that ‘Small businesses often face the problem of long-
term finance’ and committed to setting up an enquiry to investigate. Labour, after winning this 
election, set up the Wilson Committee which published a 1979 report that identified some 
supply side problems in SME finance whilst acknowledging that many of the relative 
difficulties in accessing finance relate to the higher costs and risks of providing finance to these 
firms (Wilson, 1979). 
In the 1980s, finance was tied to the concerns with SME growth discussed above, with both 
the Conservative and Liberal parties promising to extend a Business Start-Up Scheme to boost 
the numbers and the growth of SMEs by providing tax relief for investors. By the 1992 General 
Election, all three main parties were promising policy extensions or innovations to boost SMEs’ 
access to finance, with Conservatives and Labour offering special conditions for ‘inner-city 
areas’ and ‘women and ethnic minority’ businesses respectively. More recently, the 
characterisation of SMEs as credit-constrained returned to prominence as part of political 
responses to the financial crisis when the availability of bank lending and other forms of finance 
was reduced, particularly for firms with high demands or perceived as otherwise risky (Fraser 
et al., 2013). In 2010, the Conservatives promised ‘more diverse forms of affordable credit for 
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small businesses [through] a national loan guarantee scheme’ on the basis that ‘lack of access 
to credit remains a problem, especially for SMEs’. The Labour Party promised to ‘create a new 
Small Business Credit Adjudicator with statutory powers ensuring that SMEs are not turned 
down unfairly when applying to banks for finance.’ This continued into 2015 when, for 
example, Labour argued that the ‘…long-standing problems of our banking system mean that 
too many small and medium-sized businesses cannot get the finance they need to invest and 
grow.’ 
The manifestoes therefore tend to identify supply-side problems, an unwillingness on the part 
of financial institutions to provide finance to SMEs, and policies have followed. For example, 
in the mid-1970s the National Enterprise Board contained a remit for providing equity and loan 
capital to SMEs seeking funds at the lower end of the market (Lonsdale, 1997). As with 
schemes that would follow, such as the Business Expansion Scheme and various incarnations 
of loan guarantee schemes, the significance of positive impacts from such interventions has 
been called into question (Parker, 2002; Storey, 1994). The Enterprise Finance Guarantee 
scheme, for example, established in 2009 to replace the Small Firms Loan Guarantee with a 
rationale ‘targeted at small businesses affected by lack of security that would otherwise not be 
able to access conventional bank loans’ represented up to just 2% of the term loan market for 
SMEs (Allinson et al., 2013: v). 
Clearly, firms operate within a wider context that can influence business conditions (Curran, 
1987). During times of recession, when available finance may be reduced generally, ‘…lending 
institutions appear to use firm size as their primary lending criterion, with micro-business in 
particular being restricted in its access to capital’ (Cowling et al., 2012: 794). However, 
examinations of the availability of bank credit during the 1980s (Cosh and Hughes, 1994; DTI, 
1991) found that few difficulties were faced in obtaining necessary finance for investment. An 
analysis of manufacturing and business services firms, employing up to 500 people, in the mid- 
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to late-1990s suggested that ‘few firms face a problem in obtaining all of their desired external 
capital’ (Cosh et al., 2009a: 1531). Based on data gathered in 2005, Freel et al. (2012) also 
report the vast majority of applicants for credit being approved. SMEs that are ‘high-growth’ 
or pursuing innovative lines of business, potentially heightening informational asymmetries 
(and, perhaps, the perception of risk), may be more likely to report significant finance problems 
(Ennew and Binks, 1996; Freel, 2007; BIS, 2012; Baldock, 2016). However, the accumulation 
of evidence throughout our period of analysis suggests that the supply-side problems repeated 
in the manifestoes concerning the broad SME category, and many of the finance-related 
policies that have followed them, is over-stated.  
Provision of finance is also subject to demand and desire for external finance is not widespread 
among SME owners. Pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) indicates that firms use internal funds 
before seeking external sources, meaning that not all firms will seek bank loans and very few 
will sacrifice a share of ownership for equity investment (Cosh et al., 2009a; Freel, 2007; 
Parker, 2002; Wilson, 1979). During periods of heightened uncertainty demand is likely to 
decline further, although it is worth noting that this was a more significant issue in the recession 
following the financial crisis than, for example, the recession of 1991 (Cosh et al., 2009b). BIS 
(2012) cites data for SMEs with turnover below £1m as being net depositors to the tune of 
£3.7bn at the end of 2007. A more accurate characterisation of SMEs, albeit still an over-
generalisation, may therefore be a lack of desire for external finance, especially equity finance 
(accepting a role for discouragement, Fraser, 2014). Overlooking demand-side perspectives on 
accessing finance suggests a contributing factor for why supply-side-oriented policy measures 
based on a mischaracterisation of the SME category are likely to fail. 
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SMEs are over-burdened by regulation 
Regulation has figured prominently in political discourse around SMEs. While initially focused 
on taxation and largely the preserve of the Conservatives in the 1970s and 1980s, since the 
early 1990s all three mainstream parties have included proposals for reducing or reforming 
regulations, including to limit the impacts on SMEs. The 1979 Conservative manifesto 
provides a clear example of how this agenda developed to address perceived barriers, detailing 
the need to reduce taxation, form-filling and ‘amend laws such as the Employment Protection 
Act where they damage smaller businesses - and larger ones too - and actually prevent the 
creation of jobs’. 
This policy agenda developed as part of broader market liberalisation. It won influential 
support with the work of Djankov (e.g. Djankov et al., 2002, Djankov, 2009) which argued that 
the costs of regulation present a burden on entrepreneurs and that the creation of a low 
regulation economy, principally through deregulation, would therefore encourage business 
start-up and growth. However, Capelleras et al. (2008: 691) explain that those studies providing 
evidence for the Djankov view draw upon official data that exclude non-registered businesses. 
Such studies tend towards a macroeconomic focus and often draw inferences from data 
reflecting relatively large SMEs, overlooking the experiences of the more numerous very small 
firms within the SME category. These macroeconomic findings are not clearly reflected in the 
reported firm-level experiences of SMEs owners themselves. When asked about the main 
obstacles to the success of their businesses, owners express a range of views over time and 
reflecting other influences, but regulation tops the tables infrequently (see e.g. SBRT, no date).  
Nonetheless, the manifestoes and subsequent policies (and advisory bodies such as the Better 
Regulation Task Force) introduced the idea of ‘better’ regulation alongside deregulation. After 
18 years in government, the 1997 Conservative manifesto claimed they had ‘abolished over a 
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thousand regulations’. Campaigning for re-election they explained that, if they were to be re-
elected, new regulations would ‘only be introduced if it is clear that their benefits exceed their 
costs and they do not place an undue burden on a small firm’. However, the Conservatives were 
defeated by a rebranded Labour party that promised to ‘cut unnecessary red tape’ and, after 
four years in government, later proposed that ‘Regulation should be introduced, where it is 
necessary, in a light-touch way [they would also] examine opportunities to put time limits on 
regulations, deregulate by secondary legislation, and offer help to small firms’ (Labour, 2001).  
Such talk has been a consistent feature of UK political manifestoes up to and including the 
General Election in 2015. The Conservative 2015 manifesto promised to ‘cut a further £10 
billion of red tape over the next Parliament through our Red Tape Challenge and our One-In-
Two-Out rule’. Regulation therefore continues to be presented as a quantitative problem: the 
more regulations cut, the easier growing a business becomes and this can be assessed through 
a cost-benefit analysis (BIS, 2015). However, regulations, and how they are interpreted, will 
affect businesses in different ways owing to differences in firm size, age and sector, competitive 
conditions, degrees of enforcement and the responses of others in the firm’s external and 
internal environments (Arrowsmith et al., 2003; Kitching, 2006; Hart and Blackburn, 2005). 
Many regulations are also likely to not be relevant for particular SMEs. For example, an audit 
of government regulatory reform in the 2010-2015 Parliament found that 90% of the claimed 
cost reductions could be attributed to just ten regulatory decisions (NAO, 2016). This may 
explain why studies have repeatedly shown that, while business-owners complain about 
regulation in general, relatively few can provide specific instances of where their business has 
been affected by particular regulations (Edwards et al., 2004). Further, this approach fails to 
account adequately for those owner-managers who describe regulation as benefiting their 
business, not only in terms of creating a stable trading environment, establishing and protecting 
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markets (DTI, 1985) but also by supporting a firm’s development of management capabilities 
and formal processes (Kitching et al., 2015; Scott et al. 1989). 
The characterisation of SMEs as over-burdened by regulation remains influential. Yet, while 
bureaucracy is often a cost of doing business, research evidence questions whether it is one of 
the major challenges facing SMEs, sufficient to justify the attention it receives. Consequently, 
for SMEs the relevance and potential impact of deregulation and regulatory reform may be 
limited.  
Discussion 
The concerns with SMEs in the UK political manifestoes from 1964-2015 emerge from a 
relative absence prior to the 1970s to a focus on the quantity of businesses in the 1980s, to 
quality in the 1990s and then to a more balanced approach, widening the policy focus to attend 
to social issues such as marginalised communities. These broad trends are recognisable from 
the analysis of previous studies of SME policy such as Greene et al. (2007). Our analysis has 
sought to explore the underlying themes in political discourse throughout this period by 
analysing the key ways in which the category of SME has been characterised. These 
characterisations are important because they create the impression of common concerns and 
challenges within the SME category, a problem definition that governments then seek to 
address (Weiss, 1989). 
The three main UK political parties, despite their different ideological roots, have arrived at 
similar characterisations of SMEs during the period of analysis. SMEs have come to be 
characterised as having the potential for growth, struggling to access finance and being over-
burdened by regulation. This has led to similar SME policy proposals in the manifestoes and a 
lack of rigorous debate in this area of policymaking. This is despite evidence that SME policies 
have often failed to achieve their aims (Bridge, 2010), suffering displacement and deadweight 
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effects (Curran and Storey, 2002; Nightingale and Coad, 2016; Wren, 1996), insufficient 
coordination (Huggins and Williams, 2009; Turok, 1997) and a tendency to overlook available 
research evidence (Arshed et al., 2014; Blackburn and Schaper, 2012; Curran and Storey, 
2002).  
The creation of a distinct SME category has clear value for politicians and policymakers, 
simplifying complex heterogeneity (Curran and Blackburn, 2000; Leyshon, 1982; Massey, 
2006) but also establishing a target for policy interventions by creating a constituency to 
address and to fight for (Stone, 1989). However, this categorisation is problematic because it 
homogenises and obscures differences that may be important for understanding how firms 
operate, their different goals and the different challenges they encounter. This has been 
acknowledged periodically and some policies have targeted subsections of the SMEs category, 
although this has tended to be part of supporting particular sectors of the economy such as 
manufacturing. A recent, high profile report called for removing or revising the SME term and 
for a focus on high-growth businesses (Coutu, 2014) and this appears to have been listened to 
in a subsequent green paper (HM Government, 2017). However, although the evidence 
supporting this move has been well-recognised for a long time (e.g. DTI, 1994, 1995) it has 
often not been reflected in policymaking and the jobs generated by those firms labelled as high 
growth or scale ups are frequently attributed to the much broader SME category throughout 
our period of analysis. This is then frequently used as a rationale for broader SME 
policymaking. 
We have demonstrated how the characterisation of the SME category in political discourse 
contradicts empirical evidence. Many of the firms grouped together by this statistical 
convenience are ambivalent about business growth, use internal funds before seeking external 
sources (and, when external, to prefer debt-financing to equity financing) and are able to cope 
with regulation (with some studies suggesting the benefits of regulation, especially where they 
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do pursue growth). If the businesses homogenised under the SME category are significantly 
mischaracterised and the differences between them obscured, then policy in this area will 
continue to be ineffective. If seeking primarily to support job creators, addressing the concerns 
of the broad category of SMEs may itself be misguided given the disproportionate contribution 
of a handful of SMEs. 
The characterisation that has come to dominate discussion of the SME category in the 
manifestoes of the three main UK political parties is therefore a fundamental flaw in the 
development of SME policy. Failing to engage fully with empirical evidence has created a 
mischaracterisation that squeezes out the everyday experience of the majority of businesses. 
Policy developed to respond to the perceived challenges facing the firms in the SME category 
can only be developed effectively through a robust and rigorous understanding of these firms 
and their (variable) characteristics. A lack of rigorous, informed debate has contributed to 
failures to learn and develop in SME policymaking, resulting in a recycling of ineffective 
policies (Blackburn and Schaper, 2012; Bridge, 2010; Greene et al., 2007; Huggins and 
Williams, 2009). Evidence-based debate is important in achieving useful categories of business 
and accurate characterisations from which policy can be rigorously developed; our analysis 
suggests this has not yet happened in SME policymaking.  
Conclusion 
Analysis of political discourse in the UK in the form of General Election manifestos from 1964-
2015 suggests the existence of a broadly-defined SME category that has been mischaracterised 
as having the potential for growth, struggling to access finance and being over-burdened by 
regulation. While others have rightly identified the ineffective development, delivery and co-
ordination of policy initiatives in this area, we have sought to contribute to this debate by 
arguing that the problematic nature of how SMEs are categorised and characterised creates a 
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more fundamental problem. If the businesses homogenised under labels such as SME are 
significantly misrepresented and the differences between them are obscured, then it is not, for 
example, the coordination of policies that needs greatest attention but the assumptions 
underlying these policies. Importantly, these assumptions now appear shared across the 
mainstream political parties in the UK, lacking critical debate and new ideas. 
Our analysis has several limitations. Focus on SMEs within political manifestoes inevitably 
foregrounds these issues relative to wider considerations and risks placing too much emphasis 
on one area of policy. Further, while manifestoes are a valuable focus for analysis they are only 
a part of wider political debates. In choosing to cover a broad sweep of time we have prioritised 
breadth, trading-off depth as each aspect we have highlighted constitutes a field in itself. 
Nevertheless, the broader perspective offered in this paper does offer an overview of how SMEs 
are categorised and characterised to raise significant concerns about fundamental flaws in the 
assumptions underlying SME policymaking, suggesting a potential cause for its lack of 
effectiveness.  
Future research is needed to further explore the impact and implications of how SMEs are 
categorised and characterised for SME policy, amid a wider range of political discourse as well 
as in different cultural, political and economic contexts. While we focus on SME policy, there 
are also potential questions for problem definition in terms of the characterisation of 
entrepreneurs and therefore for entrepreneurship policy (see e.g. Jones and Spicer, 2005). There 
is a continuing need to robustly evaluate policy interventions but also the underlying 
assumptions that underpin them. Most importantly, there is a need to develop serious and public 
debate over SME policy through the production and promotion of rigorous empirical evidence 
that is available and promoted to stakeholders. 
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